were linked in these accounts to an interrogation of their humanity and effectiveness.

The critical histories grounded their answers to such questions in analytic notions which seem to me to be misguided. None the less, such sociological, political, and ethical questions are of abiding importance. The history of psychology and psychiatry and their allied technologies might best be understood when their very existence is first of all treated as a problem to be explained, and where their functioning is understood in relation to a wider field of systems of social regulation, political domination, and ethical judgements. I am not convinced that these questions are to be answered by a lengthy historical research programme. At the very least I suspect that we also require to find some new ways of thinking about these questions, which are not provided by any of the versions of history currently on offer.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GOVERNMENT

The national political territories in Europe and North America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were traversed by programmes for the governing of increasing areas of social and economic life in order to achieve desired objectives: security for wealth and property; continuity, efficiency, and profitability of production; public tranquillity, moral virtue, and personal responsibility. These programmes were not unified by their origin in the state, nor by the class allegiances of the forces that promoted them or the aims they set themselves. As we shall see later, they were as heterogeneous in conception and support as they were diverse in their strategies and mechanisms. What did characterize these programmes, however, was the belief in the necessity and possibility of the management of particular aspects of social and economic existence using more or less formalized means of calculation about the relationships between means and ends: what should be done, in what ways, in order to achieve this or that desirable result. Of course, my focus upon these processes of calculation is hardly original. The most instructive arguments on these lines were made by Max Weber, in his analysis of capitalism as a system characterized by monetary calculations, in which capitalists make planned use of raw materials and human activities to achieve a profit on the balance sheet.[6] However, these programmes of government not only sought to calculate and manage financial flows, raw materials, the co-ordination of stages of production, and such like, but also operated upon what Weber termed the 'psycho-physical' apparatus of human individuals, in the belief that achieving objectives depended upon the organization of the capacities and attributes of those individuals, the ways in which they were fitted to the demands of the tasks to be undertaken, the ways in which individuals could or should be co-ordinated with one another

in space, time, and sequence, the means by which those lacking appropriate capacities could be identified and excluded.

These programmes of government needed to forge a number of new instruments if they were to operate. First, a new vocabulary. For the government of an enterprise or a population, a national economy or a family, a child or, indeed, oneself, it is necessary to have a way of representing the domain to be governed, its limits, characteristics, key aspects or processes, objectives, and so forth, and of linking these together in some more or less systematic manner.[7] Whilst others have conceived of the languages used in regulatory practices as legitimations of the relations of power they install, this is to pose the question wrongly. Before one can seek to manage an economy, it is first necessary to conceptualize a set of processes and relations as an economy which is amenable to management. The birth of the national economy as a domain with its own characteristic laws and processes, a sphere which could be spoken about and about which knowledge could be gained, enables it to become an element in programmes which seek to evaluate and increase the power of nations by governing and managing 'the economy'. Similarly, the construction of a language of the enterprise, its processes and functions, enabled the development of new forms of managerial authority over the workplace and the worker. Thus such languages do not merely legitimate power or mystify domination, they actually constitute new sectors of reality and make new aspects of existence practicable.

Psychiatry, psychology, and psychoanalysis may also be considered in this way. Two distinct but related contributions can be noted. On the one hand, these sciences provided the means for the translation of human subjectivity into a term in the new languages of government of schools, prisons, factories, the labour market, and the economy. On the other hand, they constituted the domain of subjectivity as itself a possible object for rational management, such that it became possible to conceive of desired objectives – authority, tranquillity, sanity, virtue, efficiency, etc., – as achievable through the systematic government of subjectivity.[8]

For a domain to be governable, one not only needs the terms in which to speak and think about it, one also needs to be able to assess its condition.[9] That is to say, one needs intelligence or information as to what is going on in the domain one is calculating about. Information can be of various forms: written reports, drawings, pictures, numbers, charts, graphs, statistics, and so forth. It enables the features of the domain accorded pertinence – types of goods and labour, or ages of persons, their location, health, criminality – to be represented in a calculable form in the place where decisions are to be made about them: the manager's office, the war room, the case conference, the committee room of the ministry for economic affairs, or whatever. The projects for the government of social life which developed in the nineteenth century depended upon and inspired the construction of moral topographies,

and a statistical mapping of the population or at least its problematic sectors. The psychological sciences had a role here, in providing the devices by which human capacities and mental processes could be turned into information about which calculations could be made.

Such calculative practices are not auto-effective: they do not automatically produce functioning regulatory mechanisms and procedures. Vocabularies of calculation and accumulations of information go hand in hand with attempts to invent techniques by which the outcomes of calculative practices – in the form of decisions as to what should be done – can be translated into action upon the objects of calculation. New practices of regulation need to be constructed, and the psychological sciences made possible a form of rational regulation of individuality. The management of the human factor in the institutions of modern social life could now operate in terms of a norm of truth; that is to say, in terms of a knowledge of subjectivity which had the authority of science.

The psychological sciences thus play a key role in providing the vocabulary, the information, and the regulatory techniques for the government of individuals. But we should not be misled into thinking that these features of psychiatry and psychology were invented at the behest of some all-powerful authority, or at the service of some general and more or less conscious programme for control of 'deviants'.[10] As Michel Foucault and others have argued, rather than explaining these events as responses to general and abstract social demands or functions, or as part of some inexorable process of rationalization, we need to install chance within its rightful place in history. Hitherto invisible or irrelevant aspects of conduct and behaviour emerged for theoretical attention as a result of the often idiosyncratic difficulties encountered in the functioning of specific bits of social machinery. The army, the prison, the factory, the schoolroom, the family, and the community have each formed significant locations in this respect.

The figures around which concern centred often seem marginal to contemporary eyes: masturbating children and hysterical women, feeble-minded schoolchildren and defective recruits to the armed forces, workers suffering fatigue or industrial accidents, unstable or shell-shocked soldiers, lying, bed-wetting, or naughty children. Instead of pointing to overarching strategies of the state or the professions we need to describe the contingent and often surprising places in which these issues emerged as problems for authoritative attention, and the ways in which a variety of forces and groupings came to regard them as significant. Such strange alliances as those between socialists and nationalists over eugenics, and the equally strange oppositions, such as those between psychiatrists and psychologists over the pathologies of childhood, resist explanation in terms of logic of class, gender, or profession. Whilst many of these forces have pointed to political problems and made political claims, their objectives often concern virtue as much as

profit; their interests are often public good or personal happiness as much as private advancement; through their activities and inventions they actually transform the field of politics and our beliefs as to what aspects of life are administrable and by whom. Rather than seeing such forces as bodies of professional expertise serving functions for the state, we can begin to grasp the way in which the very conceptions of the nature and possibilities of regulation by social authorities have been expanded and transformed.

We should not regard the role of the psychological sciences here as one of *application* of conceptual advances made in the serenity of the study or the laboratory. The impetus did not flow from an academic centre to a practical periphery or from a knowledge of normality to an application to pathology. Those histories which draw us diagrams in these terms do so in order to free their subject from associations they consider disreputable or to re-orientate it away from directions they consider unpalatable. The psychological sciences did not consolidate themselves into disciplines around the timeless project of understanding the human mind, but around contingent and historically variable problems of institutional life, the psycho-physical capacities and behavioural phenomena which they required and sought to produce, and the variability and vicissitudes of the human subject to which they accorded a visibility and a pertinence.

DISCIPLINING DIFFERENCE

In the light of these comments, let me return to the questions with which I began. What does differentiate the psychological sciences which were born in the nineteenth century from those discourses on the human soul which preceded them, and how is this difference linked up with other social and political events? This is not a question of seeking to identify some essence or founding principle lying behind all contemporary scientific concern with human mental functioning. Quite the reverse. Faced with the evident heterogeneity of the psychological sciences, their fragmented character, their lack of agreement on theory, methods, techniques, or even subject-matter, their overlaps and boundary disputes with other sciences, we need to ask ourselves how they came to be individuated as distinct disciplines. What intellectual, social, practical, or professional forces led to their partial separation from medicine, biology, philosophy, and ethics? What produced their 'disciplinization': the establishment of university departments, professorships, degree programmes, laboratories, journals, training courses, professional associations, specialized employment statuses, and so forth? This is a question which the authoritative histories render invisible through their methodological protocols and programmatic aspirations. If the necessity of